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1”We will always remain comited to the Nations Building.”
Road sign of the “Frontier Works Organization1” on the way from
Islamabad to Muree
1. Introduction
For more than forty years of the last century, the international system as well as the
behavior of states was determined to a large extent by the rivalry between two superpowers
and their allies. The end of this era stimulated speculation on what would follow. As far as
the structure of the international system is concerned, many questions have been discussed
under the banner of the “New World Order”, an expression made popular on the occasion
of the Second Gulf War by U. S. President George Bush. President Bush thought of a post-
cold war world with a consensus among all states about “peace and security, freedom and
the rule of law”2. The underlying assumption probably was that after decades of
confrontation between east and west, the primary source of discord, conflict and waste of
human resources had gone3. It was time for a change, to distribute the peace dividend in a
fair manner.
Ten years later we must conclude that things have turned out a different way. The New
World Order has not materialized (Jacobsen 1996). On the contrary, the ending of the Cold
War has triggered an upsurge in violent conflicts, at least outside the OECD world (AKUF
2001). In some parts of the Third World4 enduring warfare and civil strife led to a total
breakdown of legitimate authority, affecting not just (“failed”) states, but entire regions. As
a result, the decay or even disintegration of states has become a new source of threat in
international politics. In some cases, the weakness of legitimate authority has already
provoked bloodshed, prompting the international community to step in to prevent further
disarray in “complex political emergencies” (Cliffe/Luckham 1999, Gros 1996), with
limited success.
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 The FWO is one f the Pakistan Army’s paramilitary units. It was formed in the aftermath of the 1965
Kashmir war to build a Himalayan supply link between Pakistan and China. After completing this work, the
FWO’s 10.000 employees remained committed to important nation-building task, e. g. constructing non-
military and military roads, airfields, canals and dams (cf. Matthews 1994).
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 President George Bush, State of the Union Speech, 29th January 1991, quoted from Freedman/Karsh (1993:
xxix).
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 For a different interpretation of warfare since 1945, see Gantzel/Schwinghammer (2000).
4
 The term “Third World” is, because it suggests a degree of uniformity in political forms that does not exist.
However, states outside the OECD world share core characteristics – peripheral position in the international
system, hybrid symbolic and social forms – which permit such a generalizing term.
2Ten years after the end of the Cold War, the fate of Third World states and the
international order in general seems as uncertain as more than 30 years ago, when the
“political order of changing societies” was discovered for the first time as a key problem of
world politics5. Things may even have deteriorated, because “failed states” are by far not
the most serious danger. They pose a risk, but the risk is limited in space and time. Of
much greater concern is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of ballistic
missiles. At a time when nuclear war between major powers seems to be more unlikely
than ever, some “rogue” states are considered to be all too ready to use these weapons, in
case they can get hold of them. And rogue states are not the only problem: The
proliferation of non-state actors has added to this predicament, the infamous Osama bin
Laden and his “network” being the most prominent of them. Failed states, rogue states,
belligerent and powerful non-state actors – a “new obscurity” seems to have taken hold of
world politics6.
On a closer look, however, the picture is not all bleak and obscure. Although a just and
peaceful world order has not materialized, a global consensus on how state and non-state
actors could achieve such a new order seems to be under way. This consensus may not be
very substantial right now, but international policymakers in east and west, in north and
south, are beginning to agree on how states should be governed properly: They should
have civil, not military rule; democracy, not dictatorship; they should include actors from
civil society into the policy process; they should respect and protect human rights; they
should promote free markets over state interference in economic processes; their
governments should be accountable and not corrupt, they should adhere to fiscal discipline
and avoid large deficits; and finally, they should favor mediation and restraint over
aggressive or belligerent postures in their international relations.
As it is easy to see, most of these values and principles are rather old. What is new is
that their world wide application is conceived not just as desirable, but even as essential for
the behavior of states under global capitalism. The catchword for these arrangements is
“good governance”, and it has become the buzzword for commentators and speechwriters
around the globe. For the social sciences, the hardest part is to explain the gap between
agreed principles and the actual behavior of states, and, possibly, to make suggestions on
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 Cf. Huntington (1968), and also Geertz (1963).
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 Jürgen Habermas (1989) introduced this concept to political discourse, initially referring to the exhaustion
of the western welfare state. Against the backdrop of a world wide decline of faith in the state as the principal
agent of development, Habermas’ critical assessment can be generalized to the developmental vision as such.
New obscurity now hints to the lack of viable alternatives for former Third Word developmental (or neo-
patrimonial) states.
3how to close that gap. Recent debates on “failed” and “terrorist” states indicate that some
states are so badly that they pose a threat to peace. Hence, ten years after the end of the
cold war, in our new world order (of) discourse, well-governed states stand against those
which are governed badly.
This paper is about one of these states: Pakistan. The South Asian nation seems to be a
case of blatant and persistent defiance of civil and democratic rule, of peace and good
governance. In recent years more than ever, Pakistan has been fighting the emerging global
consensus on numerous fronts: In May 1998, following its arch-rival India, the government
of Prime Minister Mian Nawaz Sharif conducted five nuclear tests, thereby adding a new
sort of fuel to the already volatile geopolitical scenario of the region. One year later,
Pakistan’s bid to capture the “Kargil” territory in the Indian part of the disputed territory of
Kashmir brought the subcontinent on the brink of a major – and potentially nuclear – war.
Even Pakistan’s long-time allies, the United States and China, withheld their support:
Islamabad found itself isolated on the Kashmir conflict’s diplomatic front. Since then,
Pakistan has repeatedly been censured for alleged support for violent non-state actors in
Kashmir, Afghanistan and other places of the region. Concern has been raised about
Pakistan’s commitment on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.
Arch-rival India even suggested to brand Pakistan a “terrorist state”. And finally, on
October 12th 1999, Pakistan’s armed forces staged a military coup against the government
of Nawaz Sharif, reacting in their own particular way to the Prime Minister’s sacking of
General Pervez Musharraf, the Chief of Army Staff (COAS) and military leader who is
regarded, coincidentally, as the mastermind of the Kargil conflict. Now Pakistan enters its
25th year of military rule in its 53-year history, and the tasks ahead are daunting. To name
but a few trouble-spots: The fiscal deficit has reached an all-time high; economic growth
has been strangled by post-nuclear sanctions and now hardly excels population growth; the
NGO ‘Transparency International’ has ranked the bureaucracy amongst the most corrupt in
the world for years; and, worst of all, destabilizing effects of the Islamabad-backed civil
wars in neighboring Afghanistan and Jammu & Kashmir are palpable now in Pakistan’s
society7.
So is Pakistan a “rogue” or “terrorist” state? Or, according to the revised terminology of
the U. S. Department of State, a “state of concern”? The latter is most probably true. But
for which reasons? Conventional wisdom holds that Pakistan’s basic problem is the
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 On Pakistan’s geo- and religio-political predicament, cf. Blank (1999), Rashid (2000) and Stern (2000).
Rashid (1999) provides an excellent account on Pakistan’s involvement in the second phase of the Afghan
civil war.
4permanent involvement of its armed forces in internal affairs. Repeated military
interference, one could assume, leads to bad governance. Recent developments, however,
seem contradict this assertion. In the beginning, many people in Pakistan were not unhappy
with the new military takeover., Najam Sethi, editor of a leading Pakistani weekly,
welcomed the military take-over, calling it a military counter coup against a preceding
“civilian coup” on behalf of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. Interestingly, Mr. Sethi opined
on that occasion that “democracy [is] not an end in itself.” 8 And indeed, one can argue that
Prime Minister Sharif’s government had brought state’s capabilities to a new low, and that
he had a poor record on human rights and democracy as well. His rule resembled a
“democratically elected dictatorship”: Cabinet and parliament were bypassed persistently,
the Prime Minister preferred to rule through loyalists and members of his family. He
showed no respect for the independence of the President, the Supreme Court, the press and
– finally and fatefully – the army. This last move of Nawaz Sharif was somehow
surprising, since he had relied heavily on the army in the months before the coup. The
military’s involvement in daily civil administration had been deeper than in some times of
military rule (Chengappa 1999a): Army officers were employed to conduct the census, to
catch stray dogs, to construct non-military roads and to track down “ghost schools”9. They
did all that on invitation of a civilian government which had been vested with the heaviest
mandate in Pakistan’s history. Eventually Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif decided to let the
army take control of the “Water and Power Development Authority” (WAPDA), a state-
owned enterprise which suffers heavy losses due to an extraordinary degree of corruption.
After the military takeover, new puzzling findings have come into view. Paradoxically,
the new military government under “Chief Executive” General Pervez Musharraf seems to
be more eager than any of its – civilian and military – predecessors to pursue good
governance targets. According to many observers, the men in khaki at least try to do the
right things: the documentation of the economy (tax survey), the broadening of the tax
base, an anti-corruption and accountability campaign, a crackdown on smugglers, the de-
weaponization of society, and the devolution of power to the grass-roots level including a
thirty-percent quota for woman in local parliaments. These are all part of the agenda of a
military government which, surprisingly, has involved a number of non-governmental
organizations in decision-making. To be sure: Pakistan’s current political set-up cannot be
called a democracy, but it is not a military dictatorship either (Racine 2000). These
findings raise new questions about the nature of military government. Can the army deliver
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 The Friday Times (Lahore), vol. 11, October 15th, 1999 (Editorial)
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 The term “ghost schools” refers to public educational institutions that exist only on paper.
5better than civilians? Can the military, paradoxically, even find a way out of the trilemma
of failures in civilianization, effective rule and democratization?
This paper cannot address all these questions, nor can it find conclusive answers to
them. It will try a different approach. Taking a step back, it will try to contribute to a better
understanding of Pakistan’s state-formation process and the dialectics of military and
civilian governance behind it. It is against this backdrop, the argument goes, that “good
governance” blueprints (and their failure in praxi) should be analyzed, rather than ad hoc
assumptions about the nature of civil and military regimes. Two variables are considered to
be crucial to learn more about Pakistan’s trajectory and its persistent defiance of civil and
democratic rule: the political role of the military as a corporate actor and the recurrence of
intra- and inter-state violence10.
First, I will try to highlight root causes for military-dominated state-formation, linking
internal and external factors, domestic power struggle and war-making. In doing that, I will
treat military interference, organized violence and war not as external, disruptive factors or
intervening variables, but as integral constituents of a continuous process of state-
formation. After having established why the military became the most important corporate
actor in Pakistan’s state-formation process, I will determine how Pakistan’s armed forces
and their “overdeveloped state” (Alavi 1979) tried to accommodate pressure arising from
newly mobilized social forces and a more and more hostile international environment. I
will argue that they did succeed only at the expense of the coherency, strength and
autonomy of both the armed forces and the state apparatus as a whole. The current crisis
presents itself in this context. Finally, I will explain why this does not mean that Pakistan
needs to end up as a failed state. The military as the most powerful corporate actors might
well be able to “redeploy” the state apparatus for the 21st century’s competition of lean
states (cf. Hibou 1999). In that last part of the paper I will return to the aforementioned
concepts of global governance discourse.
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 The following arguments are tentative and just a first step in a long-term project on state dynamics in
Pakistan. To some extent they are based on observations which were obtained during two field research stays
in Pakistan (1999 and 2000). A first draft of this paper had been presented at the XVIIIth World Congress of
the International Political Science Association, Quebec City, 1-5 August, 2000. The author is indebted to
Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha (Islamabad), Dietrich Jung (Copenhagen), Joel S. Migdal, Thomas Lewis (both
Seattle), Andreas Rieck, Klaus Schlichte, Peter Lock, Stephan Hensell and Karen Jaehrling (all Hamburg) for
critical comments on earlier versions of the paper.
62. State and state-formation: concepts and research agendas
In this paper, I will use the notion state-formation to describe processes to which some
authors refer as “state-building” or “state-making”. However commonplace they are, these
notions tend to treat the development of a modern state as a linear, step-wise process with a
clearly identifiable end. Also, the imageries of “building” and “making” have subjectivistic
and voluntaristic overtones which blur the unidentifiable number of factors actually
involved in this process. In order to avoid impasses of modernization theory, I will use the
terms state-building or state-making only if identifiable state projects of specific actors are
concerned.
States can be understood as agents as well as agencies (apparatuses). As such, they have
two sides, a material and a symbolic side. The material sides, i. e. the actual shapes of
institutions and policies, vary empirically to a large extent. In order to find out what states
and individual or corporate actors “acting as states” actually do, and what they do not, I use
a rather open definition. This definition is “realist” in as much as it tries to avoid
unnecessary qualifications or dichotomies about what states should do. So the concept or
definition of state (as agencies) used here is the following11:
A state is a field of rules established by practices and understandings
demarking clear boundaries – territorial boundaries as well as those separating
the state from other parts of society.
All actors on this field can act “as states” and assume the role of the state as agent. The
symbolic or normative side of the state is implied in this definition (“understandings”), and
at least in principle, the talk about what the state should do or be like varies as much from
case to case, or from region to region, as the material side. But since states are
internationally (i. e. by other states) recognized actors, the various concepts people have in
mind tend to revolve around a common core of understanding on what a “modern” – in the
context of Third World countries: “imported” (Badie 1992) – state is or should be like.12 In
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 This definition was formulated by members of the International Research Group “State Dynamics” on the
occasion of a joint workshop held with the “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik” in Ebenhausen/Germany,
autumn 1999. The members of the research group – Joel S. Migdal, Thomas Lewis (University of
Washington), Jean-François Médard, François Prkic (Centre d’Etudes de l’Afrique Noire, Bordeaux),
Beatrice Hibou, Jean-Luis Rocca, (Centre de Recherches en relations internationales, Paris), Klaus Schlichte
and Boris Wilke (University of  Hamburg) – used it as a provisional definition in their collaboration on
processes of state-formation and transformation in non-OECD countries.
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 This claim is certainly open to many challenges. However, one should not underestimate the part
international law and the international system in general play in fortifying that core. Every sovereign state is
7my view, the common core has been described most aptly by Max Weber (1980) in his
ideal-type notion of the state as the political community capable to control the means of the
legitimate use of physical violence. Weber also provides the normative context in which
state-building and state-formation turn up: the long-term process of rationalization and the
transformation of state power13.
Many authors have studied these phenomena, using different concepts for different
aspects of basically the same social processes. At least three are relevant here: Heide
Gerstenberger (1990) has reminded us that, historically, the essence of modern state-
making is the political expropriation of rulers and power holders (“Enteignung von
Herrschaftsbesitz”). To conceptualize state-making as the expropriation of means of power
enables us to understand how, historically, the use of violence has been a precondition for
the transformation of violence itself. To some extent, the power struggles among state
builders had already been analyzed extensively by Norbert Elias (1976) as the “monopoly
mechanism”. Elias insists that the monopolization of power is just one side of modern
state-formation. Effective rule depends on particular mindsets of the ruled. There is a
structural correspondence between forms of political domination and mental disposition of
subjects. The concept of ”habitus” provides this essential link between the coercive and
the subjective sides of the civilizing process. Another attempt to establish a conceptual link
between different types of government and the corresponding mindsets of rulers has been
developed by Michel Foucault. In his late studies, he favored the concept of
”governmentality” (Burchell 1991, Dean 1999) to look at how people think about
governing themselves, governing others and being governed. Governmentality links the
material development of government – files, knowledge about territory and population – to
understandings about how to use this knowledge, for which ends and in which ways.
Correspondingly, the ruled have their own idea about what the state should do for them and
what they should do for the state.
Concepts like “expropriation of means of power”, “monopoly of the legitimate use of
violence”, “habitus” and “governmentality” have all been developed against the backdrop
of European state-formation. Using them here does not imply that state-formation in the
                                                                                                                                                                       
obliged to follow a set of minimal requirements and expectations as a pre-condition to be accepted as a player
in the international arena.
13
 A last conceptual remark: We can avoid rationalistic biases if we see notions like “bureaucracy”,
“monopoly of the legitimate use of physical violence” or „legality of positive enactment“ as ideals in a
double sense: methodologically for research, and empirically as symbolic and normative expressions and
expectations. Methodologically, these notions function as “ideal-types” to measure the distance between the
norm and empirical deviations.
8Third World just echoes the European past14. Accordingly, although the paper’s
preoccupation with the control and use of violence follows some claims about the
European experience (Tilly 1985, 1990; Hintze 1962), no claim of a rerun of the European
experience is made here. The focus on core fields or functions of state domination is
deliberate and in tune with literature on state failure and state decay (cf. Schlichte 1998).
And given Pakistan’s history, the linkage of war-making and state-making as developed by
Charles Tilly appears to be a useful for understanding the Pakistan trajectory.
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 A comparative analysis of the divergent conditions of state-formation processes in Europe and South Asia
can be found in Doornbos/Kaviraj (1997).
93. The formation of an “overdeveloped” state
The following pages focus on the role of the armed forces in Pakistan’s process of state-
formation. The causes for Pakistan’s military-led state-formation will be presented in two
dimensions. The primary structure is diachronic and will demonstrate the dynamics of
state-military relations in Pakistan. Secondly, the causes the predominance of the military
in Pakistani state-formation will be contrasted as structural (historic), war-making and
state-making conditions. War-making and state-making are not identical with external and
internal factors. Although it is commonplace, such a conception would obscure more than
elucidate: No “external” factor (world market, globalization, migration, global culture,
international law and ethics) can operate separate from its own “internal” manifestation,
transformation. This is all the more true for the societies of the Third World, where hybrid
social and political forms prevail. Nevertheless, it seems to be appropriate to differentiate
between war-making and state-making because this dichotomy is vital to the common
understanding of the military’s role in society. Military personnel are almost everywhere
accepted as specialists in the exercise of violence directed to the external threats and
enemies, and they are rejected if they exercise their power for political or economic ends.
The structure of the argument enables us to identify a military spill-over from external to
internal functions or a mixture of both aspects.
3.1. The demand for Pakistan and the historical foundations of state-
formation
At least two aspects of Pakistan’s state-formation process have been exceptional right
from the start: the importance of the symbolic side and its constituting “imaginary”
(Castoriadis 1990) on the one hand, and the non-recognition of Pakistan’s territorial and
symbolic boundaries, particularly by its close neighbor India, on the other hand. Both
aspects had a lasting imprint and can be considered as historical and structural foundations
of state-formation15. The dialectics of war- and state-making are crucial to understand
Pakistan’s political history.
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 In an ethnographic study on local bureaucracy and discourses of corruption in India, Akhil Gupta (1995)
has shown the usefulness of the concept “boundaries” for analyzing Third World state dynamics. What is
peculiar about Pakistan, is that both symbolic and physical boundaries have been contested by internal and
external challengers. This led to a particular imaginary of the Pakistani state, which has been analyzed by
Ayesha Jalal (1995).
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Since 1940, the “Pakistan Movement” had demanded a separate homeland for South
Asia’s Muslim population. The rationale for its claim was provided by the “two nations
theory”, which applied the principle of national self-determination to religious
communities of the subcontinent: Hindus and Muslims, it was stated, were two nations
which could not live together peacefully in one state. When the British left South Asia in
1947, they finally endorsed that theory and divided their heritage ethnographically into two
states: Those provinces with a Muslim majority population were should form Pakistan, the
rest would remain with India. Since the Muslim majority provinces were located in the
East and the West of the British India, the new state was made up of two wings, which
were at a distance of 1.800 kilometers: (West) Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan and North-West
Frontier Province in the West, and (East) Bengal in the East. Their only binding force was
religion (Islam) and the shared belief that the Subcontinent’s Muslims needed a sovereign
state to safeguard their interests and lifestyle. An ideological state (Hussain 1979) was
born.
This leads us to a the second peculiarity of Pakistan’s state-formation. After partition,
the two nations theory remained bitterly contested by the Indian leadership. Secularism had
become India’s raison d’être, whereas the two nations theory was much of the same for
Pakistan. For that reason, any discourse on Pakistan’s identity as a nation or a state refers –
implicitly or explicitly – to its Indian counterpart. Pakistan “lives” vis-à-vis India. This
ideological divide determines the hostile relations between the two successor states of the
British Raj until the present day. Because India is more populous and more powerful in
military terms, the Pakistan Army easily assumed, as we will see, a crucial role in defining
and defending the nation and the state (cf. Khatak 1996).
The roots of the Indo-Pakistani antagonism must be traced back to colonial rule
(Blinkenberg 1972, Ganguly 1986): The closer self-rule came, the more grew the feeling
among the Muslim middle class that an independent India would be dominated by Hindu
interests at the expense of other communities. Hindus dominated India’s freedom
movement and its main organization, the “Indian National Congress”. Although the
Congress had attracted many Muslims, too, it remained a predominantly Hindu
organization. And since about three quarter of the subcontinent’s population were Hindu,
this was unlikely to change much with further democratization. Thus, to safeguard their
interests, middle class Muslims had founded the “All-India Muslim League”. Unlike the
Congress Party, which had been transformed from an elitist organization into a mass
movement, the Muslim League’s support base remained confined to the small educated
middle class of the Muslim minority provinces in North and West India. This weakness not
11
just radicalized the Muslim League, it created a heavy burden for state-building, since the
League’s support base in the territories which constituted Pakistan was tenuous. Even after
independence, support for the Pakistan idea and the new political entity came mainly from
the migrated middle class of what was now India. Pakistan was not just an ideological
state, it was also a migrant state16.
The apparatus upon which the migrant state could found its rule was comparatively
strong. Pakistan inherited its share of one most the powerful colonial bureaucracies, which
had been provided the “steel frame” for the British Raj. The British-Indian Army was a
highly professional during organization with strong roots in Indian society (Noor ul Haq
1993). However, both civil and military bureaucracy were divided at the time of partition,
creating more problems for Pakistan than for India. Both parts of the Pakistani state
apparatus operated in a new, at times hostile, environment, since the majority of the
officers, especially in the civil services, came from what was now India. At large, the state
remained at a distance from society. A dualism of state and society was established17.
3.2. The formation of the state and its armed forces – war-making
From 1947 until the 1950s, Pakistan was a “new state” (Geertz 1963) in the real sense.
Its territorial and non-territorial boundaries were contested by neighboring states – and by
internal challengers: The local and rural population had little interest in the Pakistan idea.
Some traditional rulers and strongmen in peripheral areas of what was now Pakistan tried
to resist what they considered a foreign imposition of central rule. Regional pulls became a
constant factor in Pakistan. As long as the Pakistani state was not territorially integrated
and consolidated, and as long as local strongmen openly resisted political expropriation
and a centralized monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, the boundaries between these
challengers of central rule and the state resembled more frontiers than borders. According
to the understanding of Pakistan’s state builders, these challengers were not internal ones
in the strict sense. In the 1970s and 80s, conflicts in Baluchistan and in Sindh escalated
into civil wars18. In the case of East Pakistan, Indian forces intervened and turned a civil
war into an international conflict, leading to the secession of East Pakistan which became
Bangladesh (Sisson/Rose 1990). Each civil war put strains on the military, not just the
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 On this feature, which is common to many Third World states, cf. Migdal (1988).
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 For accounts on Pakistan’s internal conflicts, cf. Amin (1988), Banuazizi/Weiner/Myron (1987) and Samad
(1995).
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secessionist conflict over Bangladesh. Designed to defend the nation, the armed forces had
to use violence against compatriots. Consequently, the military leadership became actively
involved in drawing the line between those Pakistanis who stood by the state and those
who did not, i. e. between loyal and disloyal compatriots19.
The home front was not the only source of conflict. External relations with immediate
neighbors, particularly India, remained strained. Although the British and their colonial
apparatus presided over it, partition had not been peaceful. In order to meet the criteria of
South Asia’s post-colonial settlement, i. e. to live on the “right” side of the religio-political
divide, more than 15 million people had to flee across the newly drawn border. In an
atmosphere of distrust and fear, more than one million of them were killed in massacres,
some of which were spontaneous, but others well-planned. At least in the border regions of
the partitioned province of Punjab, almost every family was affected by the bloodshed. The
religio-political divide between Hindus and Muslims, Indians and Pakistanis drew not just
a political map, but those of individuals and families as well. Since the Punjabis constituted
almost one fifty percent of West Pakistan’s population and more than three quarters of the
Pakistan Army, the bloodshed at the partition had a strong effect on army and state in
Pakistan.
Secondly, the army’s stake in defending the nation was accentuated by the Indo-
Pakistani conflict over the former princely state Jammu & Kashmir. This territory
belonged to the part of British India in which the colonial masters ruled indirectly through
local intermediaries. At the time of partition, the rulers of these 500 semi-autonomous
princely states had to opt for either India or Pakistan. In most cases, numerical superiority
of either religious community, the religious affiliation of the ruler and the adjacency to
either of the successor states coincided. The case was different in Jammu and Kashmir,
where the majority of the population was Muslim, but the ruling Maharaja was a Hindu.
Since this strategically important state was adjacent both to India and to Pakistan, both
countries wanted to integrate Jammu and Kashmir into their territory. Their claims were
reinforced by the contradicting imaginaries: For India, the integration of a Muslim majority
province would give evidence to her claim to be a secular state; for Pakistan, such an
outcome would have run against the two nations theory and the spirit of partition. As the
Maharaja was unhappy with joining either of the successor states, the conflict escalated
into the first all-out war between India and Pakistan, just two months after independence.
As a result, Jammu and Kashmir was divided along the “line of control”, giving India
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about two thirds of the territory and the bulk of the Muslim population, and Pakistan the
remainder20.
However, the conflict was far from resolved. Both countries fought two more wars for
the disputed territory. This territorial dispute lies at the heart of both the Indo-Pakistani
conflict and became the focal point for both state and military in Pakistan. Numerous
cleavages overlap here: the territorial dispute over Kashmir, the two-nations theory and the
religio-political divide. Defending the borders of Kashmir, including those effectively
ruled by India, means defending the external and symbolic boundaries of the Pakistani
state, even if this involves the direct or indirect use of force. War- and state-making
converge. And as a vital national issue, the Kashmir question provided an entry point for
the Pakistan Army into the national discourse about the nation and state of Pakistan. Until
today, no political government can make any decision about Kashmir without explicit or
implicit consent of the army.
In addition to regional pulls, bloodshed at partition and the initial phase of armed state-
building, there is a fourth factor which favored a prominent role of the military: South
Asia’s inclusion in the map of the Cold War. After a major shift in U.S. foreign policy
strategy in 1954, Pakistan turned into a key state of the American containment strategy.
Pakistan became one of the largest recipients of U. S. economic and military aid and was
seen, at least temporarily, as Washington’s “most allied ally”21. The principal beneficiary
of the U. S. aid was Pakistan’s military, particularly the army and the air force. With U. S.
assistance the Pakistan Army grew in size, morale and skills (Cloughley 1998: 36).
Educational standards became higher than in popular civilian institutions (Matthews 1994:
327). Army officers easily adapted to world politics: Through their American counterparts,
Pakistan’s top military brass gained exclusive access to decision makers Washington’s,
bypassing civilian officers and elected politicians. They even became familiar with the
western theories and political concepts of the time, which regarded the state – and under
certain circumstances even the military – as the principal agent of political development
(Shafqat 1997: 43; cf. Huntington 1968: 203). The military became an integral part of
(West-) Pakistan’s ruling “pro-state” alliance, which included the civil bureaucracy and the
emergent bourgeoisie as well. The partners of the alliance had an interest in a strong state,
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issues, including the assignment of key positions in the federal government and administration (Alavi 1990:
25)
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capable to push through a monopoly of the legitmate use of violence, and in close links to
the United States. What emerged in the 1950s was basically a double conversion of
interests and subsequent acculturation of elites: within Pakistan and between Pakistan and
the United States (Alavi 1998, Gardezi 1998). This double conversion of interests, which
became blurred temporarily in the 1960s when the USA and Pakistan clashed on the China
policy, provided the foundation for the “pro-state” alliance22.
However, it is important to note that although military men were on key positions in the
government and foreign policy was virtually in army’s hand, the military role in day-to-day
political affairs was rather limited at that time (Cloughley 1998: 52; cf. Khan 1967: 81).
And although military officers acquired some assets in Pakistan’s emerging economy, the
military’s share in trade and production was still moderate at that time. Paradoxically, it
was in aftermath of Z. B. Bhutto’s nationalization policy that the military’s rise to an active
economic player took shape (Cloughley 1998: 251).
3.3. The formation of the state and its armed forces: state-making
In order to make the state-formation process more transparent, I will make use of three
arguments which describe basically the same phenomena, albeit in different languages23.
Treating them as Pakistan-specific middle range theories, I have arranged them in an
ascending line of complexity: The “migrant state” model describes best the starting point
of Pakistani state-formation, and so and it has already been mentioned as a historical
foundation. The “overdeveloped state” thesis provides the best account for Pakistan’s
temporary consolidation as a peripheral capitalist state. And, finally, if we think about
Pakistan as a “state of martial law” (Jalal 1990), we will be able to understand the crisis of
the state which led to its transformation which will be outlined in the next chapter.
The core of the “migrant state” thesis has already been mentioned. The supporters of
the Pakistan idea belonged almost exclusively to the urban Muslim middle classes of those
territories of North and Central which remained with the Indian Union. They came to the
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Muslim majority provinces which became Pakistan as Muhajirs (refugees), and found
themselves in a environment which was much more backward in terms of social and
political development. Although Muhajirs managed to acquire an outstanding position in
business and public administration, they remained isolated as politicians, acting in a
political landscape which was dominated by powerful regional and rural actors. The
Pakistan Muslim League, successor to the All-India Muslim League, could not count on a
strong party infrastructure there. The educated and urbanized Muslim League leadership
was forced to strike compromises with landlords and feudal bosses of regional parties,
many of whom were, if ever, merely lukewarm supporters of the Pakistani state24. Since
their life worlds had barely been touched by colonial rule, they found it difficult to adapt
swiftly to a new governmentality. They had no particular interest in establishing a modern
state and a centralized monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. So this mission was left
to the state whose functionaries were, to a large extent, migrants.
The early death of Pakistan’s “father of the nation” (Quaid-i-Azam), Mohammad Ali
Jinnah, made the footing of these migrants even more tenuous. When the charismatic
President of the Muslim League and first Governor-General of Pakistan died in 1948, he
left a void in the Muslim League’s and in Pakistan’s political elite. It is a popular
interpretation of Pakistan’s political history to cite Jinnah’s early death as one of the main
causes for Pakistan’s failure in democratization. A close reading of the “migrant state”
argument stands against this argument: Jinnah was at best a half-hearted democrat25, and
the Muhajirs in general had no interest in a democratic political form in which feudal “anti-
state” forces would prevail thanks to their sheer numerical superiority (Waseem 1994:
106). In an attempt to thwart centrifugal tendencies of feudal forces from the outset, the
Muhajirs-dominated political and administrative elite fell back on so-called vice-regal
colonial practices. Similar to colonial rule, political power was concentrated in the office
of the Governor-General, who monopolized the decision-making process and persistently
bypassed Prime Minister, cabinet and legislative assembly. Out in the field offices, he
could rely on the Deputy Commissioner of the District who acted directly under his
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authority. Hence, many scholars trace the origins of Pakistan’s authoritarianism back to
this continuity of colonial administrative practices under Jinnah and his direct successors26.
Pakistan’s political predicament cannot be reduced to the lack of skillful leadership or to
organizational matters: It has a class dimension. As a class of traders, industrialists and
civil servants, the Muhajirs needed a functioning state apparatus which was able to
maintain the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence and give some degree of
predictability to social and economic life. However, even the bureaucracy, unlike its Indian
counterpart, could not simply carry on with the “job already done” in the colonial era,
since the “steel frame” had been rather fragile in those at large indirectly administered
territories which were now part of Pakistan. Lacking a political party network and an
experienced civil service, the government’s writ was tenuous, particularly in rural areas.
For this reason, the Muhajirs needed the collaboration of other segments of society. The
Punjabi leadership, who represented almost fifty per cent of West-Pakistan’s population,
was the best partner available. Punjabis were strong in the countryside, strong in business
and, most importantly, they dominated the army, being joined there by the Pathans. Both
Pathans and Punjabis had assumed the habitus of “martial races” under British rule. Since
they had experience inside colonial apparatus, they shared many features of the Muhajirs’
governmentality. That made them ideal partners for the Muhajirs, who were regarded not
as a martial race, but as “sissy”.
Since both were “sons of the soil”, local people, the incorporation of Punjabis and
Pathans already transcends the “migrant state” model, leading the “overdeveloped state”
model27. This model is crucial to learn more about the social basis of the state, to
comprehend how the military as a corporate actor entered the political arena, and why the
state was able to become and remain strong in a hostile environment. Before army officers
reached higher echelons of the state apparatus, politician-turned bureaucrats had been
actually in charge of running the country. Democracy was held in abeyance. Vital and far-
reaching decisions, such as the U.S.-Pakistan Military alliance and economic policy
strategy, had been taken by top bureaucrats (Kapur 1991). Already in the 1950s the
bureaucrats came under fire from politicians and the masses. Particularly politicians from
East Pakistan, where the majority of Pakistan’s population lived, were at odds with
economic and foreign policy designs which undoubtedly patronized development in West
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Pakistan. Against this backdrop, a “civilian coup” was staged in 1955, to be followed by a
military take-over in 1958, the beginning of the era of Field Marshall Ayub Khan. The
coups must be classified as veto- and guardian coups (cf. Huntington 1968: 219-237): As
the spearhead of the ruling West Pakistani power coalition, the top civilian and military
leaders intervened in order to thwart a possible “takeover” by predominantly East Pakistani
forces, which could be described at the same time as democratic, pro-society, anti-state and
anti-military.
Ayub Khan’s coup also stands for a critical juncture of the intra-elite power struggle:
Military officers grew from a junior partners of civilian bureaucrats to guardians of the
state. The army personnel acquired a peculiar governmentality, which can be found until
the present day: According to this worldview, army interventions in state affairs are
pertinent to keep the state apparatus working smoothly. Since politicians are narrow-
minded, the masses uneducated and many of the civil servants corrupt, the men in uniform
have to step in from time to time in order to safeguard Pakistan’s economic and social
development: People have to be led, since they cannot take care of themselves, and they
have to be led by the army, because Pakistan’s politicians are too corrupt and selfish. This
implies an exceptional role for Pakistan’s army in state-formation28. In line with this
reasoning, army recruits were taught that Pakistan’s geopolitical position calls for an
outstanding role of what is perceived as its strategic “core area” and industrial “heartland”:
the Punjab. Since, coincidentally, about three quarter of all army soldiers come from just
five districts in Punjab and neighboring North-West Frontier Province, the call for soldier’s
mission to defend the nation falls on futile ground (Cohen 1984: 44, 115). It hardly needs
to be mentioned that this position is sustained by war-making factors described in the
preceding section. Army’s and Pakistan’s raison d’être overlap: Ayub’s coup safeguarded
a strong state apparatus, capable to keep the monopoly of the legitimate use of force at
least in core regions. By and large, the state remains at a distance from society, and is
therefore “overdeveloped” in relation to society, to use Alavi’s words.
The overdeveloped state became the most important actor in Ayub’s “developmental
decades”. In close cooperation with international governmental and non-governmental
actors, Pakistan’s top bureaucrats and military officers pursued a strategy of export-
oriented growth, championing Pakistan’s early integration into the world economy.
However, this policy was only halfway successful. Spatially, growth was concentrated on
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core areas in Punjab and in Sindh’s capital Karachi; socially, an alliance of top bureaucrats,
military leaders, a few landlords and some 22 bourgeois families were the main
beneficiaries of the economy’s expansion (Alavi 1983; Gardezi/Rashid 1983). The masses
remained excluded from the political field as well. Indirect democracy was introduced by
local election of 80.000 “basic democrats”, who participated in local district affairs and
elected, or rather acclaimed, the President (Ayub). The scheme sought to provide a popular
basis for Ayub’s regime and to broaden and limit the social basis of the state at the same
time. However, “partial mobilization” (Jalal 1990: 304) was not successful: At the end of
the 1960s, the overdeveloped state’s detachment from society and the mass population’s
exclusion from economic growth led to social unrest and to a severe crisis of the state.
The dimension of this crisis and its “solution” cannot be explained sufficiently by the
“overdeveloped state” model: Neither can it account for the violent reaction of the political
and military class, nor does it sufficiently elucidate the role of the military in state-
formation. It provides neither the link between state and society, nor for the underlying
motives of governance. For which ends and by which means does the state try to extract
resources from society? A convincing answer to this question can be obtained from Ayesha
Jalal’s (1990) work. She argues that, right from the beginning, Pakistan’s state-formation
process had been guided by defense matters. Defense spending not just posed a tremendous
financial burden on Pakistan’s “state of martial law”, accounting for the largest part of
the budget for decades; more importantly, the underlying motives for state growth in
general have been dictated by the necessity to expand the defense budget, in order to match
the Indian military capacity. Inasmuch as military officers have been involved in decision-
making and, more importantly, in securing links to international financial players from the
beginning, Ayesha Jalal’s notion that a “political economy of defense” provides the basis
for Pakistan’s superstructure has much plausibility. One could argue that the basic law
guiding Pakistan’s political economy has been to be ready for war. And not just that: The
failure of civilians agencies to provide internal peace prosperity prompted the army the
early state-building interventions, army’s reaction to the Lahore religiously motivated riots
of 1953 being a good example: After restoring law and order, the army did simply not
leave the scene but extended martial law for several weeks in order to make Punjab’s
capital a cleaner and brighter city (Cloughley 1998: 43; Siddiqi 1996: 26). The army action
was celebrated by the local population and the national press, establishing for the first time
a firm link between (internal) war-making, state-building and good governance29.
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As a mentality, or a dispositif, the state of martial law has been in place from day one.
But it became dominant at the end of the initial phase of state-formation, leading to the
first transformation of the overdeveloped state. The first military takeover in 1958 had
been a move to consolidate the state. However, when the degree of “Punjabization”30 and
exclusion of large parts of the East Pakistani population triggered, first, an autonomy
movement, and then a civil war, it was not the question of consolidating an overdeveloped,
detached state any more; it was the question of crushing a resistance movement with sheer
and brutal military force and employing troops against those compatriots which were now
considered just hostile “elements” (Siddiqi 1996: 155-181). Whereas in the 1950s and
early 1960s, the overdeveloped state had been able to transform war-making (as a means of
expropriation of power) into a monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, and to establish
a certain degree of governmental predictability, the martial law state disclosed that the
consolidation of the overdeveloped state had failed. The state fell back into war-making in
the literal sense. Force had to be used to protect the ruling elite, blurring the boundaries
between legal and illegal, and bearing a new governmentality.
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4. State dynamics: The transformation of an overdeveloped state
The dimension of the transformation came to full display after East Pakistan’s war of
secession. From the height of its esteem in the 1965, when they fought the second Kashmir
war against India, the military’s image had become more and more dismal. Finally, the
Bangladesh war was lost on two fronts: First the military leadership lost war of words for
the right ideology and governmentality against the East Pakistan opposition, necessitating
the resort to arms against its own citizens. And back in its war-making camp, it was
defeated by internal (East Bengal) and external (India) adversaries. Also, the U. S.–
Pakistani military cooperation had proved worthless when it came to India and Kashmir.
And with the amputation of the Eastern wing, Pakistan’s bold stand to provide a homeland
for all Muslims of the subcontinent, the two nation theory of the migrant state, had lost all
credibility.
However, the defeat of the all-powerful army could have provided a good opportunity
to establish a fresh set of rules for the state field. For the first time in Pakistan’s history, the
political field was open to politicians and – to some extent – to the people of Pakistan. And
there was a chance to break the Punjabi hegemony in the West, because the Pakistan’s new
ruler, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, was a Sindhi with widespread support in all provinces.
Moreover, his “Pakistan People’s Party” was much stronger than previous parties, both in
organization and appeal. Bhutto took power as President and Civil Martial Law
Administrator in 1972 and, one year later, he became Prime Minister under a new
constitution, vested with all necessary authority to govern the country31. And indeed,
Bhutto’s rule brought a transformation of Pakistan’s rules of the game, a new populist style
of governance, a new governmentality. Bhutto favored a much more active role of the state
in relation to society and to its subjects. Through “deliberate use of state power” and
“planned state intervention” Bhutto sought to reshape the economic and political landscape
of Pakistan (Shafqat 1997: 125) More important than his new policies was his new political
style: In stark contrast to Ayub’s elitist approach, Bhutto reached out to the masses,
aroused their feelings, and attempted to re-shape and to discipline their minds and bodies
(cf. Shafqat 1997: 130, 136). Through the principle of “lateral entry” to bureaucracy he
tried to break the Punjabi and Muhajir domination and, concomitantly, the anti-society
esprit de corps in higher echelons of the state (Kennedy 1987). In reaction to newly
mobilized social forces instigating widespread popular protest, Bhutto tried to balance
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social disparities and enhance the state capabilities in the economic sphere. The state
nationalized heavy industry and banking services, it monopolized investment activity and
other key economic decisions. All these measures could be understood as an attempt to
broaden the social basis and, possibly, deepen the reach of the state. To assure the
separation of military and civilian powers, Bhutto introduced the para-military Federal
Security Service, which acted under the Prime Ministers authority. Just like the principal of
lateral entry, para-military forces were used by Bhutto to enhance his personal control over
the political process. Using “dirty tricks” in pursuit of “politics of survival” (Migdal 1988),
key governmental positions were filled with loyalists, the military service was cleansed,
party dissidents and potential critics were thrown out of office and terrorized. His attempt
to broaden the basis of the state turned into a weakening of the state’s basis and its
apparatus. Instead of broadening and deepening the state, Bhutto endangered its
fundamental pillars. The bureaucracy became highly politicized, large parts of the army
antagonized, and the business community resented the nationalization of heavy industry
and banking services.
Strategically speaking, Bhutto’s biggest mistake was to carry his attempt to keep the
military out only half-way: In his brutal suppression of labor unrest and language riots, and
even more in his campaign of political expropriation against the Baluchistan autonomy
movement, which escalated into a civil war from 1973 to 1977, Bhutto had to employ the
army again. Again, war-making brought the army back to state-making (Siddiqi 1996:
229). And in July 1977, a political stalemate between Prime Minister and a strong
opposition force was broken by a military coup d’état, led by the Chief of the Army Staff,
General Zia ul-Haq. Bhutto’s policies posed a threat both to the power of Pakistan’s old
ruling alliance and to the integrity of the state itself. In line with the political economy of
defense, the military considered it as its duty to perform the role as guardian of the state. It
was the fourth military coup in Pakistan’s history, and again the military claimed that it
was forced to intervene in order to save the country from further disarray, maybe even
form all-out civil war (Arif 1995: 72). The attempt to develop stronger bonds between state
and society and to transform an autocratic overdeveloped state had failed.
General Zia ul-Haq stayed in office as Chief Martial Law Administrator and President
until his deadly plane crash on August 11th, 198832. He established what many consider as
the first genuine military rule, imposing draconian punishments against opposing political
activists, and letting army men assuming responsibilities in key departments of the civil
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administration and in key sectors of the economy as well. Pakistan witnessed a far-
reaching transformation of state and society. According to the military leadership, the army
was forced by Bhutto’s legacy of a weakened civil administration to take direct
responsibility for governing the state. For the “pro-state” forces, Bhutto’s populist handling
of pressures arising from social mobilization had exposed the dangers of democracy. The
state apparatus had to be defended against pressures from society. After restoring law and
order, the army re-established the power of the civil bureaucrats, though this time they
were junior partners. In effect, Zia secured the army’s hegemony within the state apparatus
and in society in general. No other political or societal actor could challenge it (Kapur
1991: 182). Many (retired) army officials were posted at higher levels of administration,
and some military institutions even assumed first and foremost civilian tasks. Retired
officers also assumed upper positions in state enterprises and in profitable sectors of the
(legal and illegal) economy. All in all, about ten per cent of all top governmental and
business posts are taken by retired army officers (Duncan 1989: 282). Zia established a
dense network of key administrative and business position holders, a “vertical” network of
businessmen of his favor, one of them being the upcoming Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif
(Duncan 1989: 94; Burki 1991: 103ff.). The objective of this network approach was to lend
legitimacy to his dictatorship, and to trigger economic growth: As in the 1950s, the state
sidelined the attempt to generate growth by putting into place a new class of capitalists.
However, this time the governmental rules did not follow the developmental state logic.
Pakistan’s economy was opened to all sorts of – legal and illegal – international markets,
which provided for much of the boom of the 1980s.
Boundaries between state and society, internal and external business of the state,
between state-making and war-making, were blurred at large. Take the“ Inter Services
Intelligence” (ISI): Both civilian and military officers work for the ISI, which had initially
been founded as a foreign secret service after the First Kashmir War in 1949. Under Zia’s
rule, the ISI assumed the role of an all-powerful agency with the capability to act almost
unchallenged inside Pakistan. The political cell of the ISI infiltrated political parties and
manipulated the political process, even under democratic rule (Chengappa 2000). At the
same time, the ISI played a crucial role in Afghanistan’s civil war (Yousaf/Adkin 1992).
Pakistan’s status as a frontline state had tremendous repercussions for its political economy
(of defense). U. S. governmental agencies supplied huge sums of military and economic
aid, initiating a war boom throughout Pakistan. The flow of military and economic aid and,
also, the arms and drugs pipeline through Pakistan provided multiple opportunities for
diverting money into the pockets of (military and civilian) state officials and businessmen,
making war profits a major source of enrichment in the Zia era (Kartha 1999). The
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informal economy grew at high rates, reaching about one third of the formal economy
(Hyman 1988: 94).
Pakistan had to pay a heavy price for the war boom. Since the economy’s expansion
relied almost entirely on army power, the military’s share in the national budget rose
steadily to more than quarter at the end of Zia’s rule. At the same time, public investment
in education and development came to new lows. Z. A. Bhutto had tried to expand the state
vertically and horizontally, attaining the contrary in many respects. Zia accepted the state’s
unwilling retreat from some of his functions. As far as the administration of violence is
concerned, the fighting in Afghanistan had a serious fallout on the home front: The
proliferation small arms and illicit drugs led to the establishment of a “Kalashnikov
culture” in and around the economic powerhouse Karachi33, and also in other parts of the
country. The smugglers and transport Mafia, religious and non-religious non-state actors
were provided with military hardware for several years of insurgency and terror.
It is important to note that Zia’s military rule differed in many respects from the
previous ones. The military rose to the most powerful political and economic actor in
Pakistan. Its involvement in daily administration was deeper, state-making and war-making
converged more than ever. As far as governmentality is concerned, there was the new role
of Islam: As a legacy of Bhutto’s rule, Zia and his generals were forced to control
pressures from a highly politicized and mobilized society. In order to reach out to and
regain control of his subjects, Zia attempted to re-write Pakistan’s self-understanding as a
political entity from a Muslim to an Islamic state. Pakistan’s people had to be good citizens
and faithful Muslims, with the state ensuring the application of secular as well as holy
rules. Islamization was as a means to re-establish and potentially broaden (Malik 1989) the
state’s writ on a society which always been indifferent to westernized concepts, even if
they were in proto-Islamic shape like the two nations theory. Non-state actors who had
hitherto opposed Pakistan’s state project, such as the ulema (clergy), became part of the
ruling coalition, or they were at least used by it34. Like in other fields, it became more and
more difficult to differentiate between state- and non-state actors. Finally, although the
military as a corporate actor was more unchallenged than ever, the deep and broad
involvement in governance began to cause rifts inside the military. The army pushed Air
Force and Navy even more into the background of political and military decision-making.
Some agencies, such as the ISI or the Military Intelligence (MI), assumed an independent
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but outstanding role in both fields, war- and state-making (Chengappa 1999a; Kartha
1999).
Despite some modest experiences with democracy in the mid-80s, it is doubtful whether
Zia had any plan to end his tenure (Arif 1995: 252). So it was up to his still mysterious
deadly plane crash on August 11th, 1988 to change the rules of the game. His successor as
Chief of the Army Staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, preferred to hand over to power to the
civilians. He probably anticipated that with the U. S. and Soviet involvement in the Afghan
war coming to an end, the raison d’être of America’s support would disappear.
International support for war-making would die under the conditions of the New World
Order, so it was time for the military to step down. It is debatable whether what followed,
the two governments of Benazir Bhutto (1988-90, 1993-96) and Nawaz Sharif (1990-93,
1996-99), can be regarded as transition from military to civilian rule or even as an era of
democratization (cf. Rais 1997, Rizvi 1998, Shafqat 1998). Elections were held several
times, reasonably fair ones even, and civil society and the public sphere gained a good deal
of breathing space. However, although there was a succession of democratically elected
governments, this was not due to democratic change in the strict sense. No government
survived its term, all were dismissed by the President, presumably on behalf of the army.
At least prima facie, these dismissals were perfectly legal, because the (non-elected)
President did have these powers under the 8th amendment to the constitution, which
provided some kind of arbiter role for the Head of State. Corruption and inefficiency were
among the reasons cited as justifications for the dismissals, and everybody knew that these
allegations were not unfounded: Politicians and bureaucrats were corrupt, inefficient, and
sometimes political processes remind of racket rule more than of good governance35.
On the other hand, these (true) allegations echoed well-known statist military
governmentality. For good reasons, since the generals remained kingmakers and arbiters in
Pakistan’s longest period of democratic rule, not the Presidents. The governments of
Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif had to work under tutelage of the army. The army’s
guardian role was half-way institutionalized in the 8th amendment, allowing the armed
forces to preside over Pakistan’s state-formation process. And they did more than just
preside over: from time to time, they became heavily engaged in the business of the state,
sometimes on invitation of the government, and many times against the will of elected
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politicians who fell victim to ISI manipulation (Chengappa 1999a, 2000; Shafqat 1997).
Through welfare trusts, public and private enterprises, all established or expanded under
Zia, they had their share in documented and undocumented businesses, adding to the
blurring of boundaries between state and non-state, politics and business, public and
private (Kartha 1999).
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5. State decay or redeployment of the state?
Hence, there is compelling evidence suggesting – once again – state decay or state
failure in Pakistan. The full dimension of the Pakistan predicament has been aptly
described by Stephen Cohen (1984: 18) some time ago:
“Pakistan present nuclear program [...] and the maintenance of a twenty-division army may
be justifiable in strategic terms, but the leadership of Pakistan has no idea whether such
effort may not destroy the state [...] without a shot being fired”.
Since then, things have turned from bad to worse: Nuclear weapons have been tested,
the fiscal crisis has worsened and state capabilities have come down. Worst of it all, the
proliferation of small arms and belligerent non-state actors makes it much more likely that
the state could be destroyed with many, many shots being fired. Cohen argues forcefully
that there are no easy answers in Pakistan. Given the current geopolitical conditions in
South Asia, large shares of military expenditure are not surprising. And given the fact that
war- and state-making have been converging numerous times, creating internal dynamics
and constraints of their own, we must assume that South Asian peace alone would just be a
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for resolving the trilemma of failures in
civilianization, effective rule and democratization mentioned in the introductory chapter.
We have to reconsider the dialectics of war- and state-making to find way out for Pakistan.
I will do that on the following pages, providing a tentative and speculative sketch.
The preceding chapters have shown that, right from the start, state-making and war-
making were daunting tasks. The people in charge – bureaucrats on the one side, army
officers on the other – were at great pains in protecting and dominating the state field
against adversaries from in and outside the official borders. Internally, they had to confine
their effort to some “core” state: secure the most essential rules inside narrowly drawn
boundaries; externally, they had to prepare for war, since Pakistan’s territorial status (if we
include – as we must, following official ideology – Jammu and Kashmir) was not clearly
determined. More importantly, external and internal matters were mixed right from the
start, giving the army a key state-building role.
The state apparatus became both overcharged and overdeveloped in relation to civil
society. The groups acting on the state field used their position to create a capitalist
dynamic and even a capitalist class, which became their ally. No wonder, the bureaucrats
used their position to their own profit, thereby creating “corruption”. Additionally, they
built up ties to the emergent capitalist class and to the rural champions, the landlords.
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However, this attempt to build up a viable economy and a stable political framework
failed, since it was at odds with popular sentiment, particularly in East Pakistan. At this
juncture, the army intervened openly, “in order to prevent further disarray”, if we follow
their governmentality. Bearing in mind that the state apparatus had always been crucial as
an economic asset, it is of no great surprise that the army, albeit very slowly, gained a very
prominent role in the economy. But until Z. A. Bhutto’s reign, there was no need for the
military to interfere directly into civilian affairs. Military rule was an arbiter job. Now,
under Bhutto, the economic assets were found to be in danger, because the state had begun
to crumble as a result of Z. A. Bhutto’s attempt to broaden it. The military – in order to
secure its own survival – took control of vital parts of the economic flows within and
without the state. Actions inside the state field became even more crucial economically,
since the bulk of Pakistan’s imported boom passed or originated there.
In contrast to Ayub’s era, the generals did not have any design of a developmental state
in mind. They did not even take much care to implement the most essential rules, as gun
culture and widespread political violence demonstrate. One could argue that state decay, if
we use this expression, had begun under Bhutto and continued under military rule. When
they handed over the Reststate to the civilian actors, the generals could count on
constitutional and non-constitutional safeguards guaranteeing access to the commanding
heights in case of emergency. Besides, they monopolized the key foreign policy issues and
kept the control over the military budget. The civilian governments worked under tutelage
of the army. And politicians continued what they had learned under Zia ul-Haq: They
treated the state apparatus as an economic asset, subverting the rules used on this field to
their own favor: “dirty tricks” secured their survival. The undocumented economy,
established by Zia’s martial law state in the 1980s, took root all over Pakistan and provided
them sources of enrichment, despite a shrinking fiscal basis of the state. Although the
military as a corporate actor also made its bargain, it had to rely on state income. No state,
no military. Therefore, the diminishing fiscal basis of the state and the became a case in
point for military takeover, since it threatened the professional and corporate interests of
the military (cf. Rizvi 1998). And there were even more important reasons. After having
been on collision course with almost every powerful state actor, Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif took on the army, trying to create more rifts in their ranks. He managed to take
control of the ISI, prompting a struggle between government-controlled ISI and army-
controlled Military Intelligence (MI). The clash between ISI and MI which preceded the
military takeover of 1999 indicates a new degree of intra-military divisions (Chengappa
1999b).
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So what will the men in khaki do this time? Their main policies have been cited at the
beginning: tax survey and reform, accountability campaign, crackdown on smugglers, de-
weaponization of society, and devolution of power. De-weaponization, tax reform and
crackdown on smugglers are all attempts to strengthen core functions the state apparatus:
administration of violence, extraction capability and the implementation of rules. Given the
country’s history of military-led state-formation, it is not very surprising that the army
takes on this task. More interesting are accountability and devolution of power.
Accountability suits fine to army governmentality. Given the widespread disillusionment
with politicians and bureaucrats, it lends some legitimacy. The same could be true of the
devolution of power, which is a catchy good governance slogan as well. On a closer look36,
the proposals under considerations at the time of writing are surprising. They will provide
democracy below the province level for the first time. The Deputy Commissioner, who has
hitherto worked under the supervision of the government, would be replaced by an elected
chief mayor. This would not just mean a strengthening of the grass roots level, but a
complete break with the tradition of vice-regalism and the overdeveloped, martial law
state. The new state would not be detached any more, but more or less firmly anchored in
society.
One can only speculate about motives for this move. Considered as different parts of
one strategy, accountability and devolution of power could constitute a declaration of war
against both political parties and bureaucrats. Political parties would come under pressure
from below, and they would lose their status as (weak) mediators between state and
society. Elections being held on a non-party basis, the feudally-dominated parties would
lose their financial backbone. Given the fact that bureaucrats are targeted firmly by the
accountability campaign, the military would be left as the sole strong corporate actor on
the state’s field.
But there are also some economic aspects in recent moves. The army’s involvement in
civil affairs could be interpreted as an attempt to rescue the more profitable parts of the
state and the economy. The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA),
controlled by army officers, is a good example. Currently, they are also taking control of
the railways. The privatization of these and other state-managed enterprises would not just
make the state “leaner”, but enable key military actors to gain from such transactions. In
the long run, state decay could be restricted to those regions which are of no importance
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for Pakistan’s economy and to those state functions which are remains of the
“overdeveloped” developmental state. “State decay” would turn into downsizing or
“redeployment” of the state. But in order to get there and to bring down the highly
unprofitable share of military expenditures, the army would have to transform itself at least
partially into a civilian actor (Ahmed 1999). 30.000 soldiers running WAPDA could be
seen as a starting point. However, it is rather uncertain whether profitable enterprises and a
lean state would be able to trigger economic growth big enough to “feed” the less
profitable parts of economy and society.
So there is no easy solution in sight for the Pakistan predicament. What does all this tell
us about the aforementioned concepts of good governance and the New World Order? The
good governance discourse is palpable even in Pakistan, producing strange alliances, such
as between the current military government and some NGOs. Considering that many
NGOs are financed from abroad, the overdeveloped and migrant state argument has
sustained its validity in a rather strange way. Given the army’s history as guardian of the
state, it should be of no surprise that they are in charge of redeploying Pakistan. Success,
however, is not guaranteed, and “anti-state” forces are waiting.
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6. Epilogue
This paper has been drafted in summer 2000, an earlier version of it in autumn 1999. The
latter had to be revised because, at the very moment of its first (and last) presentation, it
had become outdated. The night before, General Pervez Musharraf’s had assumed power
and put an end to Pakistan’s longest experiment with civilian rule. This is just another
indicator of how fast things tend to change in Pakistan. One factor, however, remains
constant: the military’s involvement in running the government. The public’s reaction to it,
however, fluctuates. Initially, military takeovers have been welcomed by a substantial part
of the Pakistani public. As every military regime promises to do no more than to prepare
the ground for real and true democracy, people tend to give them the benefit of the doubt.
But after some time, when the army tightened its grip on society, with no sign of an early
return into the barracks, the mood soured, opposition movements turned up and onto the
street.
The current military regime is no exception to this rule. In the first instant many people
cheered the army, or at least showed sighs of relief that an increasingly authoritarian
government had been ousted. Even more, the perception among many liberal Pakistanis
was that this time the Generals were doing the right things. But now, sooner than under
previous military regimes, many erstwhile supporters of the military “counter coup” have
become critical, disappointed, maybe disillusioned. They have seen the military
government backing down on almost every issue it had promised to challenge: The
government’s anti-corruption drive faced strong criticism because military officers and the
judiciary were (unofficially) exempted from it, “to prevent state collapse”; the government
backed down on regulating and controlling religious schools alleged to train the militants
who now also strike inside Pakistan due to reasons of “national security”; the same applies
to the crackdown on smugglers and other traders unwilling to cooperate with the tax
authorities37. In the last months, even the local government reform earned harsh criticism.
A journal initially supportive of the governments plans sees them as part of a plan to
establish an authoritarian presidential form of government, quite similar to Field Marshal
Ayub Khan’s military regime38. If implemented, it is claimed, the plans would carry the
country away from parlamentary democracy to an executive-centered political system. As
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the military’s grip on society tightens, many doubt that the military regime would comply
with the three-year deadline the Supreme Court has imposed for the return to civil and
democratic rule. But many observers find this period too long anyway. For them it is a
matter of fact now that Pakistan’s dictator has become “useless”39.
Many critics are right. The government did back down many issues. At the same time,
the army’s involvement has become deeper than before. As announced, army monitoring
teams were employed at many levels of bureaucracy to examine the “performance,
integrity, behavior and responsiveness” of the personnel40. As under previous military
regimes, the political decision-making has been monopolized by an inner army circle,
comprising of the Chief of the Army Staff (General Musharraf), the ISI and MI chiefs, the
nine Corps Commanders and some other staff officers41. Two Provincial Governors have
resigned from their posts because of repeated interference into their political affairs by the
regional Corps Commanders. The outstanding role of the nine Corps Commanders and the
army staff officers is not restricted to provincial affairs. For similar reasons, some federal
ministers have left the cabinet. Hence, there are many indicators of prolonged military rule.
On a closer look, however, some arguments of the critics tell as much about the
(govern-) mentalities of the criticizers as about the policies of the criticized. This applies
not just to calls for an earlier return to democratic rule, but in particular to those (domestic
and international) critics who lament the military regime’s “performance”. The latter term
denotes an peculiar understanding of politics very much in line which good governance
discourse. However, politics is still as much about power as about performance or good
will of the political personnel. In this regard, by the way, the political field does not differ
much from other societal fields: Just like any other CEO, Chief Executive General Pervez
Musharraf has to reconcile different, often contradicting, goals and interests: those of his
company (Pakistan), which need not to identical with those of his workers (citizens); those
of his branch (army), which may conflict with those of other branches (bureaucracy,
judiciary, parliament); those of his inner circle (his fellow Generals), which are surely at
odds with those of other networks and peer groups; and, maybe, the General has even some
strictly personal goals (e. g. reputation as a national leader). And just like anybody, he is
working under circumstances which are not of his own making, fighting against
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competitors who have at their disposal huge sums of capital, of all sorts: economic, social,
cultural, even symbolic.
Given these natural constraints and the actual resistance his policies met from different
societal actors (clergy, traders, bureaucrats), General Pervez Musharraf’s “politics of
survival” have been quite unspectacular. Their limited success hint at the firmness of
resistance he faces from competitors. Whether these competitors are more sympathetic
than the current regime will remain a matter of controversy. There are good arguments to
support the “Alliance for Restoration of Democracy” (ARD), an all-party alliance which
tries to topple the military regime42. One can even cite historical experience: Yes, by
interfering into the political process right from the beginning and by intimidating
politicians the military in Pakistan did create the very mess (weak political institutions) it is
now (as ever) trying clean up (Zaidi 1999); and, for sure, military rule is not the solution to
Pakistan’s predicament, to the trilemma of failures in civilianization, effective rule and
democratization; it is part of the problem. But this could be rendered academic in near
future, because, as has been stated in a totally different context, “the truth does not explain
much” (Cartwright 1983: 72). In politics, as in life in general, it is timing that is most
crucial. And for now, it can be no matter of controversy that Pakistan is facing not just a
crisis of democratic rule or of good governance, but a crisis of the state. There seems to be
too much at stake right now to wait for a political actor capable of pursuing all targets:
civilianization, democratization and good governance. And just as some people in Pakistan
still await the introduction of interest-free banking, observers inside and outside Pakistan
seem to wait for political actors who do not pursue their own – particular – interests.
Everybody knows, they will not show up, even after the army’s return to the barracks.
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